Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 309941.cor.pdf

Citation: Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 309941.cor.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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at 574; Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wn.2d 405,518 P.2d 721 (1974); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811

F.2d 698, 732 (2d Cir. 1987). Thus, we address the merits of Brownfield's disability

discrimination claim. I

I Judge Whaley ruled that no reasonable jury could find that an adverse
employment action resulted from anything other than plaintiff's unfitness
for duty and his insubordination. In other words, Judge Whaley found
insubordination and unfitness for duty to be the only cause of the discharge.
Disability was not even a "substantial factor" in the firing. Thus, one could
conclude that collateral estoppel should bar the WLAD suit, despite the
different standard of causation from an ADA claim. We have found no
decision that applies collateral estoppel, however, when the legal standard

No. 30994-1-111
Brownfield v. City of Yakima

The WLAD makes it "an unfair practice for any employer ... [t]o discharge or bar

any person from employment because of ... the presence of any sensory, mental, or

physical disability." RCW 49.60.180. "[T]he prohibition against discrimination because

of such disability shall not apply if the particular disability prevents the proper

performance of the particular worker involved." RCW 49.60.180(1).

"An employee claiming discrimination must first prove a prima facie case of

discrimination and, ifhe or she does so, then the burden shifts to the employer to pt:esent

evidence suggesting a nondiscriminatory reason for [the termination]." SWinford v. Russ

Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 82 Wn. App. 401, 413-14, 918 P.2d 186 (1996) (citations

omitted). "If the employer sustains its burden, the employee must then demonstrate that