Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 309941.cor.pdf

Citation: Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 309941.cor.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/309941.cor.pdf ↗

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plaintiff was discharged for nondiscriminatory reasons); see also Indiana Dep 't ofEnvtl.

Mgmt. v. Conard, 614 N.E.2d 916,923 (1993); Jerome J. Steiker Co., Inc. v. Eccelston

Properties Ltd., 156 Misc. 2d 308,313,593 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1992); Copper State Thrift &

Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387,390 (1987); Levy v. Cohen, 19 Cal. 3d 165, 137 Cal. Rptr.

162, 166, 561 P.2d 252 (1977).

The application of collateral estoppel does not work an injustice on Officer

Brownfield. Factors recognized under this fourth prong of collateral estoppel include:

whether the first judgment was appealable, whether there have been factual changes since

the first proceeding, and whether the first determination was manifestly erroneous.

Trautman, supra, at 805,841-42. The judgment in the federal case was appealable. In

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No. 30994-1-111
Brownfield v. City o/Yakima

fact, it was affinned on appeal. See Brownfield, 612 F.3d 1140. The record contains no

indication that any factual changes have occurred since the first proceeding. The first

decision was not manifestly erroneous.

In support of his wrongful discharge claim and other claims, Jeff Brownfield

complains that the city of Yakima ordered him to a "fourth" FFDE before Dr. William

Ekemo. We question whether the additional visit to Dr. Ekemo can be considered a

"fourth" evaluation. More importantly, we are bound to conclude that the demand to

return to Dr. Ekemo was a legitimate demand. In the United States District Court suit,

Judge Whaley ruled as a matter of law that the direction to return to Ekemo was a valid

demand. For the same reasons that collateral estoppel applies to Judge Whaley's ruling