Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 309941.cor.pdf

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that insubordination was the reason for the termination from employment, Brownfield is

barred from contending the direction to return to Dr. Ekemo to complete the evaluation

was wrongful.

Issue III: Did the trial court err when granting summary judgment on Jeff

Brownfield's claim he was tenninated from employment because of a disability, when

Brownfield fails to provide any evidence or argument that the city of Yakima's firing him

for insubordination was a pretext? No.

In his' complaint, Jeff Brownfield alleges two forms of disability discrimination:

termination from employment and a failure to accommodate. The two fonns are discrete

No.30994-1-III
Brownfield v. City ofYakima

claims. Johnson v. Chevron US.A., Inc., 159 Wn. App. 18,27-8,244 P.3d 438 (2010).

We will address the claims separately.

The trial court correctly refused to apply collateral estoppel from Judge Whaley's

rulings regarding Brownfield's ADA claim to his WLAD claim. The ADA requires a

plaintiff to prove, "but for" the illicit motive of a disability, he would not have been fired.

Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010). The WLAD

imposes a less strict standard of causation upon the plaintiff-a "substantial factor" test.

Fell v. Spokane Transit Auth., 128 Wn.2d 618,637,911 P.2d 1319 (1996); Wash. State

Commc'n Access Project v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 173 Wn. App. 174, 187, reviewed

denied, 293 P.3d 413 (2013). Thus, Jeff Brownfield could win under Washington law,

but lose under federal law. Issues are not identical and collateral estoppel will not apply

when the standards governing them are significantly different. Hanson, 121 Wn.2d 552