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the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success. (Baral v.
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 (Baral).) We review the trial court’s decision to deny
an anti-SLAPP motion de novo. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325–326.)
A. First Prong – Arises Out of Protected Activity
The critical consideration on the first prong is whether the cause of action is based
on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity. (Feldman v. 1100 Park
Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1477–1478 (Feldman).) “Our focus is on
the principal thrust or gravamen of the causes of action, i.e., the allegedly wrongful and
injury-producing conduct that provides the foundation for the claims.” (Castleman v.
Sagaser (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 490–491.) “Allegations of protected activity that
merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under
the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394.)
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the claims for wrongful eviction, malicious
prosecution, and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment arise out of protected activity.
(See Feldman, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1479–1480 [prosecution of unlawful
detainer action “indisputably” protected activity under anti-SLAPP law]; Briggs v. Eden
Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 [communications
preparatory to or in anticipation of action are protected activities under anti-SLAPP
law].)
The debate here centers on the attorney defendants’ argument that the fourth cause
of action under Civil Code section 1950.5, subdivision (b)(1), also arises out of protected
activity because it expressly incorporates the prior allegations of protected activity (i.e.,
service of the three-day notices and prosecution of the unlawful detainer). The attorney
defendants deduce that the fourth cause of action could only arise out of their activities as
litigation counsel, inasmuch as Meyers established in his supporting declaration that he
had no involvement in Pineda’s handling of plaintiffs’ security deposit.
We conclude the fourth cause of action does not arise out of protected activity on
the part of the attorney defendants. The principal thrust of this claim is the application of