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has two parallel and independent sources for the doctrine of retaliatory eviction.” (Glaser v.
Meyers (1983) 137 Cal.App.3d 770, 775.) In interpreting section 1942.5, the court was
expansive, emphasizing the “important public policies” the remedies authorized by that
statute serve. Section 1942.5, the court said, “is a remedial statute aimed at protecting
tenants from certain types of abuses” (Barela, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 251), and “[i]mplicit in
the passage of any remedial legislation is a general intent to protect from intimidation those
who report violations of the law.” (Id. at p. 252.) Thus, section 1942.5 is to be “ ‘liberally
construed to effect its objectives and to suppress, not encourage, the mischief at which it
was directed.’ ” (Barela, supra, at p. 251.)
2. Action Apartment v. City of Santa Monica
Turning specifically to whether the litigation privilege defeats Winslett’s claims
under section 1942.5, subdivision (d), Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232 (Action Apartment) provides the framework for analysis. At issue
in that case was the City of Santa Monica’s Tenant Harassment Ordinance, which
prohibited, among other things, maliciously serving a notice of eviction or bringing any
action to recover possession of a rental unit without a reasonable factual or legal basis. (Id.
at p. 1237.) Violation of this prohibition was subject to both criminal and civil penalties,
with civil enforcement available to “ ‘[a]ny person.’ ” (Id. at p. 1239.) The case was a class
action by landlords seeking to have Santa Monica Municipal Code section 4.56.020,
subdivision (i)(1) declared invalid on preemption grounds, and among the statutes cited as
having preemptive effect was section 47, subdivision (b), which embodies the litigation
privilege. (Action Apartment, supra, at pp. 1239-1240.)
The text of section 47, subdivision (b), “provides that a ‘publication or broadcast’
made as part of a ‘judicial proceeding’ is privileged. This privilege is absolute in nature,
applying ‘to all publications, irrespective of their maliciousness.’ [Citation.] ‘The usual
formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve
the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the
action.’ [Citation.] The privilege ‘is not limited to statements made during a trial or other