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reasons of public policy, such an eviction cannot be permitted.’ ” (Schweiger, supra, at
pp. 512-513.)
Less than a year later, the same landlord surfaced again in Aweeka v. Bonds (1971)
20 Cal.App.3d 278, a Court of Appeal case that also involved a pre-section 1942.5 eviction.
The Aweeka case was a virtual replay of Schweiger, supra, 3 Cal.3d. 507, but in a slightly
different procedural posture. There, a group of tenants demanded the repair of dilapidated
conditions, and for that, their rent was raised from $75 to $145 per month. Instead of
waiting to be sued in an unlawful detainer action, they sued for retaliatory eviction. They
lost on demurrer. Reversing, the Court of Appeal extended Schweiger to authorize an
affirmative claim for damages. The court explained: “We can discern no rational basis for
allowing . . . a substantive defense while denying an affirmative cause of action. It would
be unfair and unreasonable to require a tenant, subjected to a retaliatory rent increase by the
landlord, to wait and raise the matter as a defense only, after he is confronted with an
unlawful detainer action and a possible lien on his personal property. . . . Accordingly, we
conclude on the authority of Schweiger that the complaint stated a cause of action for
retaliatory eviction.” (Aweeka, supra, at p. 281.)
Following Schweiger, 3 Cal.3d. 507, there was some uncertainty as to whether AB
2033 took up the field and provided an exclusive set of tenant-protection remedies.
Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616 supplied the answer. In that case, the high
court held that there is an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases and that
damages may be recovered if a breach of the warranty is proved. “Although past cases have
held that the Legislature intended the remedies afforded by section 1942 to be the sole
procedure for enforcing the statutory duty on landlords imposed by section 1941,” the
Green court explained, “no decision has suggested that the Legislature designed these
statutory provisions to displace the common law in fixing the respective rights of landlord
and tenant. On the contrary, the statutory remedies of section 1942 have traditionally been
viewed as additional to, and complementary of, the tenant’s common law rights.” (Green,
supra, at pp. 629-630.)