4
above, in her own declaration and various exhibits documenting her tenancy. Sagi lodged a
raft of objections on relevance, hearsay, and lack of foundation grounds.
After hearing argument on the anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court granted it, striking
all three of the challenged causes of action. The court ruled that these claims are based on
protected activity because “the filing of unlawful detainer actions [is] protected activity,”
and “the gravamen of this case is . . . the UD case itself.” The court also ruled, as a matter
of law, that the litigation privilege prevents Winslett from succeeding on any of the three
claims. It overruled Sagi’s evidentiary objections, except for the relevance objection, which
it sustained in light of its ruling on the litigation privilege.
Prominent in the court’s reasoning was the voluntary settlement of the unlawful
detainer action. The court noted that the unlawful detainer case was dismissed 12 days
before Winslett filed her lawsuit against Sagi and indicated that it was bearing in mind the
way that action ended—in the form of an agreed resolution. “[I]n looking at the probability
of success in this case,” the court said, the settlement was significant, since it bore on “the
potential relevancy” to the merits of her current claims.
This timely appeal followed. Three days after Winslett filed her notice of appeal,
Sagi filed a motion in the trial court for attorney fees and costs under Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1). That motion was eventually granted, with the
court awarding him $9,465 in fees and costs. Along with her appeal of the order on the
underlying anti-SLAPP motion, Winslett now seeks review of the award of fees and costs.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Anti-SLAPP analysis under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 proceeds in two
familiar steps. In the first step, the defendant must make “ ‘ “a threshold showing that the
challenged cause of action is one ‘arising from’ protected activity.” ’ ” (Barry v. State Bar
of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 321 (Barry); Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82,
88 (Navellier).) In this context, the term “ ‘ “protected activity” ’ ” refers to speech or
petitioning activities. (Barry, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 321.) If the court finds the defendant