Beyond the various notice provisions calculated to alert the tenant to the imminence of litigation and to prompt the respondent-tenant’s appearance in court (three-day demand for rent, postcard notice and seventy-two-hour notice of eviction), the Housing Part is vested with broad equitable jurisdiction over housing matters (CCA 110). A final judgment of possession may be vacated by the court which issued it (CPLR 5015) upon an order to show cause brought by the tenant establishing "underlying merit and a reasonable excuse for the default” (New York City Hous. Auth. v Torres, 61 AD2d 681, 683). In appropriate circumstances, the authority retained by the court over a summary proceeding extends to the reinstatement of a tenant even after the warrant of eviction has been executed (e.g., Solack Estates v Goodman, 78 AD2d 512; Central Brooklyn Urban Dev. Corp. v Copeland, 122 Misc 2d 726). Thus, the expediency of an additional stage of judicial *35review is highly questionable and, in any event, adverse to the legislative scheme underlying RPAPL article 7, which requires that the proceeding to recover possession of real property retain its intended summary nature. This axiom is clearly compromised by the perception that it is a time-consuming undertaking fraught with procedural complexity and, for some purposes at least, less expeditious than a plenary action for ejectment in Supreme Court, a procedural device deemed "expensive and dilatory” and in response to which the summary proceeding was enacted by the Legislature as a "remedial act” (Lynde v Noble, 20 Johns 80, 82 [1822]).