Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Citation
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Parent Document
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Jurisdiction
- New York (state)
- Effective Date
- 1993-12-07
- Original Source
- https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6103695/brusco-v-braun/ ↗
Other Sections in This Document (33)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
- Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27 (1993)
Full Text
1,055 charsThe distinction sought to be drawn between "render” and such kindred terms as "grant”, "give” or "award” is purely semantic. "Render” and "give” are synonymous in the context of directing the entry of judgment (Garner, Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, at 474). A far more compelling explanation for addressing the statutory command to the Judge is to provide consistency in the procedure for entry of judgment in special proceedings generally. The provisions of both RPAPL 747 (1) and CPLR 411 state, in haec verba, "The court shall direct that a [final] judgment be entered determining the rights of the parties”. Moreover, RPAPL 732 (3) contains a provision to stay issuance of the warrant, and it is beyond cavil that the imposition of a stay is a matter uniquely entrusted to the discretion of a Judge. The entry of judgment and the determination on the discretionary stay, collectively, cannot therefore be characterized as a "mere ministerial act” within the authority of the clerk, as supposed in Matter of Park Holding Co. v Arber (supra, at 43).