Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 903 F.3d 32 (2018)

Citation: Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 903 F.3d 32 (2018)
Parent Document: Theodore Hayes v. Philip Harvey, 903 F.3d 32 (2018)
Jurisdiction: United States (federal)
Effective Date: 2018-08-31
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4531965/theodore-hayes-v-philip-harvey/ ↗

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              period the family makes such an
              election and continues to so reside,
              the rent for the dwelling unit of the
              family in such project exceeds the
              applicable payment standard . . . ,
              the amount of rental assistance
              provided on behalf of the family
              shall be determined using a
              payment standard that is equal to
              the rent for the dwelling unit (as
              such rent may be increased from
              time-to-time), subject to paragraph
              10(A) of subsection (o) of this
              section and any other reasonable
              limit prescribed by the [HUD]
              Secretary, except that a limit shall
              not be considered reasonable for
              purposes of this subparagraph if it
              adversely affects such assisted
              families . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
       The majority bases its sweeping view of the enhanced
voucher statute on these four words—“may elect to remain”—
which it largely reads in isolation. Indeed, despite repeatedly
acknowledging that a statute must be examined in context, the
majority never attempts to examine the key four words within
the context of the enhanced voucher provision, let alone the
“broader context of the statute as a whole.” Rosenberg, 274
F.3d at 141 (quoting Marshak, 240 F.3d at 192). By failing to
read these words in context, the majority incorrectly
determines that this provision is somehow directed at property
owners. Then, based on this incorrect premise, the majority
infers a “right to remain” because if an assisted family “may

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