This court has not previously ruled on what the phrase “subject to the tenant’s consent” means in this context or what the landlord needs to show in terms of requesting consent. We conclude, however, that the landlord’s claim of breach on this point can be resolved without interpreting the provision at issue. Even assuming the landlord had validly sought the tenant’s consent, and further assuming that the tenant had unreasonably withheld it, the landlord could not have succeeded on his claim of breach of contract. The record includes undisputed evidence13 establishing that, after notifying the tenant of his *156intent to access the premises, the landlord in fact entered the property and made repairs requested by the tenant. At that point, the landlord no longer needed the tenant’s consent, and it would have been practically and legally meaningless for the tenant to give consent during the thirty-day “cure” period to which she was entitled after receiving the notice of eviction.14 For the same reasons, the landlord could not satisfy a necessary element of a breach of contract claim. To prevail on a claim of breach of contract, the landlord would have to prove not only a breach of a contractual obligation, but also some type of injury resulting from the breach. See, e.g., Entrepreneur, Ltd. v. Yasuna, 498 A.2d 1151, 1161, 1164 (D.C.1985) (noting that “relevant to the question of forfeiture is whether any prejudice has accrued to the landlord by reason of the breach,” and rejecting jury verdict in landlord’s favor where breach “had been cured” by “the time this action came to trial”). As any possible breach by the tenant did not deter the landlord from accomplishing his purpose, and no injury is claimed or apparent, the jury could not have found for the landlord on this claim of breach. “Forfeiture is unnecessary here to vindicate any substantial right of the [landlord], since no damage has accrued to [him] by virtue of the [alleged] breach.” Id. at 1164.