Clark v. Bridges, 75 A.3d 149 (2013)

Citation: Clark v. Bridges, 75 A.3d 149 (2013)
Parent Document: Clark v. Bridges, 75 A.3d 149 (2013)
Jurisdiction: DC (municipal)
Effective Date: 2013-08-22
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5147069/clark-v-bridges/ ↗

Full Text

1,360 chars

The practical application of these provisions was explained by this court in Singer v. Singer, 583 A.2d 689 (D.C.1990). There, the court held that the plain language now included in D.C. Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) created a five-day period (exclusive of weekends and legal holidays) that preceded the commencement of the ensuing thirty-day period for noting an appeal under D.C. Appellate Rule 4(a)(1). Accordingly, the two time periods were calculated separately, affording affected parties a variable total time period of at least thirty-five days (depending on intervening weekends and holidays) in which to file a notice of appeal. Indeed, for a time, almost all parties received the benefit of the extra five days. In Cooler v. Chapman, 885 A.2d 1279, 1280 (D.C.2005), this court noted the effect of a change in the text of the rules, which deleted an earlier clause that applied this five-day period to only those judgments and orders “entered or decided out of the presence of parties and counsel.” At that time Superior Court Civil Rule 77(d) (2005) required service by mail “in virtually all civil cases,” so almost all parties were entitled to the extra time for mailing provided by our rule. Id. (noting inapplicability of earlier cases, like District of Columbia v. Murtaugh, 728 A.2d 1237, 1242 (D.C.1999), which had been decided under previous rule).

Other Sections in This Document (34)

Full Text