The landlord's defense premised on that theory must fail. Even if the landlord's complaint could be construed in that way (accepting the trial court's perception that the parties' interactions left each knowing full well that the landlord was relying on a pattern of nonpayment), the landlord failed to satisfy a statutory precondition to filing suit for possession. Under D.C.Code §§ 42-3505.01(a) and (b) (2001), unless the suit is for "nonpayment of rent," the landlord may not sue for possession before expiration of "a written notice to vacate . . . contain[ing] a statement detailing the reasons for the eviction" and giving the tenant thirty days within which "to correct the violation or vacate." See Mullin v. N Street Follies Ltd. P'ship, 712 A.2d 487, 491 (D.C.1998) (citing Cormier v. McRae, 609 A.2d 676, 680-81 (D.C.1992)) (quoting Cooley v. Suitland Pkwy. Overlook Tenants' Ass'n, 460 A.2d 574, 575-76 (D.C.1983)). A suit for repeated failure to pay rent when due is a suit for breach of covenant requiring the detailed written notice specified by §§ 42-3505.01(a) and (b); it is not a simple suit *633 for nonpayment exempted from that requirement. See Mullin, 712 A.2d. at 491 (holding that "the notice provisions of the Rental Housing Act expressly do not apply" in nonpayment of rent cases); Pritch v. Henry, 543 A.2d 808, 811-12 (D.C.1988) (distinguishing between required length of cure period in late payment of rent cases and cases for breach of other obligations covered by the Rental Housing Act); see also Kaiser v. Rapley, 380 A.2d 995, 997 (D.C.1977) (recognizing difference between a claim for nonpayment of rent and claim for "a willful, calculated and consistent failure by a tenant to pay rent when due").