We therefore conclude that the distinction between an option to renew a lease and an option for an extended term is supported by the clear weight of authority, and must be maintained unless, as held in Kentucky Lumber Co. v. Newell, there is enough in the lease to show that the parties in fact intended that the lessee should have the right to retain the premises beyond the original term without the execution of a renewal lease. In the ease at bar the provision of the lease that Grant should have the property for a term extending to September 1,1911, with privilege to renew for a year from September 1, 1911, must be read.in connection with the provision of the lease that should the lessee continue to occupy the premises after the expiration of the term, the tenancy may be terminated at any time at the option of the lessor; and when the lease is so read it must mean that Grant may hold the premises for a term extending to September 1,1911, with privilege to renew for a year from September 1,1911, but that should he continue to occupy the premises after September 1,1911, without renewing the lease, with or without the consent of the lessor, the tenancy may be terminated at any time at the option of the lessor. This being the meaning of the lease, Section 2296 Ky. St. applies. Its purpose is to define the rights of the parties and thus avoid uncertainty and litigation. Under the facts stated, Grant was not liable for the rent for the remainder of the year after he vacated the premises.