State v. Schwab, 693 P.2d 108 (1985)

Citation: State v. Schwab, 693 P.2d 108 (1985)
Parent Document: State v. Schwab, 693 P.2d 108 (1985)
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
Effective Date: 1985-01-11
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1172955/state-v-schwab/ ↗

Full Text

1,244 chars

[1] The Attorney General in this case, as suggested by some commentators in the past, urges this court to hold that the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86, is available as a vehicle for enforcing tenants' rights as those rights are established by the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973, RCW 59.18.[19] One recurring argument, as expressed in the Attorney General's brief herein, is that "violations of statutes promulgated in the public interest constitute per se violations, thus creating in the state a power of enforcement in order that the beneficial purposes of the statutes are carried out."[20] Since all statutes are presumably promulgated by the Legislature in the public interest, this is tantamount to arguing that any violation of a statute is a per se violation of the public interest and that a Consumer *549 Protection Act action can be brought thereon by either the Attorney General[21] or a private party.[22] This court rejected that precise argument in Haner v. Quincy Farm Chems., Inc., 97 Wn.2d 753, 761-63, 649 P.2d 828 (1982). As succinctly put in Sato v. Century 21 Ocean Shores Real Estate, 101 Wn.2d 599, 601, 681 P.2d 242 (1984), "not every violation of a statute results in a per se consumer protection action."

Other Sections in This Document (177)

Full Text