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INTERNAL PROTOTYPE — NOT LEGAL ADVICE — DO NOT SEND

State v. Schwab, 693 P.2d 108 (1985)

Citation
State v. Schwab, 693 P.2d 108 (1985)
Parent Document
State v. Schwab, 693 P.2d 108 (1985)
Jurisdiction
Washington (state)
Effective Date
1985-01-11

Other Sections in This Document (177)

Full Text

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The Attorney General in this case, as suggested by some commentators in the past, urges this court to hold that the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86, is available as a vehicle for enforcing tenants' rights as those rights are established by the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973, RCW 59.18.19 One recurring argument, as expressed in the Attorney General's brief herein, is that "violations of statutes promulgated in the public interest constitute per se violations, thus creating in the state a power of enforcement in order that the beneficial purposes of the statutes are carried out."20 Since all statutes are presumably promulgated by the Legislature in the public interest, this is tantamount to arguing that any violation of a statute is a per se violation of the public interest and that a Consumer *549Protection Act action can be brought thereon by either the Attorney General21 or a private party.22 This court rejected that precise argument in Haner v. Quincy Farm Chems., Inc., 97 Wn.2d 753, 761-63, 649 P.2d 828 (1982). As succinctly put in Sato v. Century 21 Ocean Shores Real Estate, 101 Wn.2d 599, 601, 681 P.2d 242 (1984), "not every violation of a statute results in a per se consumer protection action."