State v. Hemingway, 196 Vt. 441 (2014)

Citation: State v. Hemingway, 196 Vt. 441 (2014)
Parent Document: State v. Hemingway, 196 Vt. 441 (2014)
Jurisdiction: Vermont (state)
Effective Date: 2014-05-09
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2673207/state-v-hemingway/ ↗

Full Text

1,346 chars

¶ 31.        
Here, the statute at issue falls into the latter category.  The
main purpose of the statute is to provide defendants with notice of probation
conditions in accordance with due process requirements.  See State v.
Gleason, 154 Vt. 205, 216, 576 A.2d 1246, 1252 (1990) (holding that due
process requires that defendant has fair notice of what acts will violate
probation, and that instructions from probation officer can provide such
notice).  This is reflected in the limited discussion of § 252(c) in
our cases.  In State v. Peck, 149 Vt. 617, 547 A.2d 1329 (1988),
this Court held that “due process requires that a convicted offender be given
fair notice as to what acts may constitute a violation of his probation,
thereby subjecting him to loss of liberty.”  Id. at 619, 547 A.2d
at 1331.  This Court described that such notice could be accomplished
through the § 252(c) certificate requirement or it could “be provided by the
instructions and directions given to defendant by his or her probation
officer.”  Id. at 619-20, 547 A.2d at 1331.  This indicates
that § 252(c) is one, but not the sole, means to provide defendants with
notice.  Thus, where the statute is not followed, but the defendant
otherwise receives notice of a condition, the subsequent proceedings to enforce
the noticed condition are valid.

Other Sections in This Document (105)

Full Text