Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 841190.pdf

Citation: Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 841190.pdf
Jurisdiction: Washington (state)
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Original Source: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/841190.pdf ↗

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the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the [recipients] agree to

comply with federally imposed conditions.’” S.S. v. Alexander, 143 Wn. App. 75,

94-95, 177 P.3d 724 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Davis v.

Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 143 L. Ed. 2d

839 (1999)). Thus, “[u]nlike ordinary legislation, which ‘imposes congressional

policy’ on regulated parties ‘involuntarily,’ Spending Clause legislation operates

based on consent: ‘in return for federal funds, the [recipients] agree to comply

with federally imposed conditions.’” Cummings, 142 S. Ct. at 1570 (quoting

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 67

L. Ed. 2d 694 (1981)). Thus, only landlords that have accepted certain federal

financial benefits are subject to the mandates of § 9058. See 15 U.S.C. §

9058(a)(2) (defining “covered propert[ies]”). Although Sherwood Auburn would

prefer that the CARES Act notice provision simply proscribed the superior court’s

authority to enforce a lease agreement, it is only those landlords that have

accepted certain federal financial benefits on which Congress has the authority to

impose restrictions. 8

4

Sherwood Auburn further asserts that a conflict between § 9058(c) of the

CARES Act and our state’s 14-day notice requirement, RCW 59.12.030(3),