tenant to vacate the covered dwelling unit before the date that is 30 days after
the date on which the lessor provides the tenant with a notice to vacate.” 15
U.S.C. § 9058(c)(1) (emphasis added). “An unambiguous statute is not subject
to judicial construction,” and we “must derive its meaning from the plain
language” of the statute. Sprint Spectrum, LP/Sprint PCS v. City of Seattle, 131
Wn. App. 339, 346, 127 P.3d 755 (2006). Here, Congress unambiguously
provided that “the lessor” may not require a tenant to vacate prior to providing a
30-day notice. 6
2
Moreover, Sherwood Auburn’s interpretation of the CARES Act notice
provision would render that provision meaningless. See Ballard Square Condo.
date on which the lessor provides the tenant with a notice to vacate.” 15 U.S.C. § 9058(c).
Those are not the words that Congress chose.
6
Based on decisional authority holding that a landlord may not use “self-help methods to
remove a tenant,” Gray v. Pierce County Hous. Auth., 123 Wn. App. 744, 757, 97 P.3d 26 (2004),
Sherwood Auburn concludes that it is not the landlord but, instead, the superior court that
requires a tenant to vacate. However, the fact that a landlord must follow lawful methods in
evicting a tenant—i.e., providing proper notice—does not mean that it is the superior court that
does so.
8
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
No. 84119-0-I/9
Owners Ass’n v. Dynasty Constr. Co., 158 Wn.2d 603, 610, 146 P.3d 914 (2006)
(“[A] court may not construe a statute in a way that renders statutory language
meaningless or superfluous.”). The purposes of the notice requirement in an
unlawful detainer action are to both notify the tenant of the alleged default and