because 90 days after the property is listed for sale is always later than 90 days
after the tenant has vacated the property. Thus, the Owner contends that to
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No. 74434-8-1/7
harmonize the provisions we must read SMC 22.206.160(C)(1)(f) as permitting
the sale to occur before the tenant vacates the property.
The argument is unpersuasive. First, whether an owner may list a property
for sale prior to it being vacated by the tenant is not at issue in this case. The
issue before us is whether an owner may enter into an agreement to sell the
property and, as part of the agreement, agree to evict the tenant using the "elects
to sell" provision of the JCEO. Second, the Owner's analysis is flawed because it
is improperly limited to an alleged inconsistency in a single section of the JCEO.
It fails to reconcile other related provisions and the statutory scheme of the JCEO
as a whole. Viewing the ordinance as a whole, the Owner's interpretation of
"elects to sell" allows developers to frustrate Seattle's tenant protection scheme
and the tenant relocation license requirement. The statutory scheme confirms
that the provision's plain language is not reasonably susceptible to the
interpretation proposed by the Owner.
We do not defer to an agency's interpretation of an unambiguous statute.
Brown v. City of Seattle, 117 Wn. App. 781, 72 P.3d 764 (2003), as corrected
(Aug. 14, 2003). But here, the City's interpretation of the ordinance is consistent
with the unambiguous language defining "elects to sell." The Director's Order
clearly explains that this interpretation enables the policy goals of the JCEO: