Prudhon for $17,725.46 in attorney fees and costs. Prudhon appeals.
DISCUSSION
Prudhon argues that the "elects to sell" notice terminating his tenancy was
invalid under the JCEO because it was issued after the Burnsides sold the
property. Prudhon's interpretation of the JCEO requires landlords to provide
notice of termination before entering an agreement to sell the rental property.
The Owner argues that the JCEO "elects to sell" provision unambiguously
permits a landlord to terminate a tenancy after a rental property has been sold.
Interpretation of a statute presents a question of law reviewed de novo.
Ruvalcaba v. Kwang Ho Baek, 175 Wn.2d 1,6, 282 P.3d 1083 (2012). Courts
interpret local ordinances the same as statutes. Sleasman v. City of Lacey, 159
Wn.2d 639, 643, 151 P.3d 990 (2007). The court's primary duty in interpreting a
statute is to "discern and implement the intent of the legislature." State v. J.P.,
149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) (quoting Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v.
Riveland, 138 Wn.2d 9, 19, 978 P.2d 481 (1999)). We begin with the statute's
plain meaning. Id. We discern plain meaning from the ordinary meaning of the
language, related provisions in the statute, and the statutory scheme as a whole.
3
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
No. 74434-8-1/4
State, Dep't of Ecology V. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4,
10 (2002). The plain meaning is "derived from what the Legislature has said in its
enactments, but that meaning is discerned from all that the Legislature has said
in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the
provision in question." Id. A statute is unambiguous where the plain language is