No. 74434-8-1/5
The parties dispute whether the Burnsides can "elect to sell" property that
they already sold. Prudhon adopts the City's interpretation of the ordinance,
which is that "elects to sell" applies to owners who intend to sell, and have not
already sold, the property. CP at 37. The Owner argues that "elects to sell"
includes an owner who intends to sell or has already sold the property.
To determine whether the plain language of "elects to sell" encompasses
property that was already sold, we begin with its ordinary meaning. The
ordinance defines "elects to sell" as "when the owner makes reasonable attempts
to sell the dwelling within 30 days after the tenant has vacated . Former SMC
22.206.160(C)(1)(f). The Owner argues that this definition merely provides an
end date by which there must be attempts to sell, and therefore does not
preclude the prior sale of property. "Elects to sell" is defined by an owner's
activities after the tenant vacates, such as listing the property for sale with a
realty agency or in a newspaper. These are relevant only to the prospective sale
of property. The provision also employs phrases oriented toward future action: an
owner "elects" to sell, "attempts" to sell, and "intends" to sell after the tenant
vacates pursuant to just cause notice. While the ordinance may not expressly
preclude a prior sale, neither does it contemplate a prior sale. The ordinance
definition supports Prudhon's interpretation of the statute because it defines
"elects to sell" with prospective action: attempting to sell after the tenant has
vacated.
Related provisions and Seattle's statutory scheme further elucidate the
plain meaning of this ordinance. The JCEO provides just cause for eviction under