Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 726668.pdf

perceptions. His physicians testified that they wrote to the County requesting

accommodations for PTSD, endorsed his belief that his condition flared due to

stress at work, and even opined on his character. When cross-examining Dr.

McClung, Marin repeatedly asked whether certain perceptions were "spot-on."

Only then, on redirect, did the County clarify with McClung that Marin's

perceptions were not all "spot-on."

Finally, Marin waived any objection under ER 702 that a paranoid-traits

diagnosis is not a "recognized" diagnosis, making any testimony about it

inadmissible. Although he hints at this argument, Marin does not argue the

elements of the test for admissibility under Frye v. United States55 or cite to

authority. Also, he did not object to McClung's testimony on this basis at trial.

54 Cf In re Meistrell, 47 Wn. App. 100, 109, 733 P.2d 1004 (1987) (holding
that ER 404 does not exclude prior mental history as character evidence).
55 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see Anderson v. Akzo Nobel Coatings.
Inc.. 172 Wn.2d 593, 603, 260 P.3d 857 (2011) (applying Frye test in
Washington).
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Thus, he did not preserve the issue for appeal.56 McClung's testimony was

admissible both on the merits and to rebut Marin's witnesses.

Directed Verdict on Retaliation Aspect of Hostile Work Environment Claim

Marin contends the trial court erred by dismissing Marin's claim of hostile

work environment based on retaliation. We review a ruling on a motion for

directed verdict under the same standard as the trial court, affirming the directed

verdict when "'there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inference to sustain

a verdict for the nonmoving party.'"57