Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 726668.pdf

hospital, suspended him for two weeks without pay, gave him a written reprimand

and sent it to his supervisor along with a list of threatening comments he

allegedly made, removed him from his ward and patient interaction, and reported

him to the Department of Health and the police.31 The hospital argued that as a

matter of law, some of these acts were not adverse. The court disagreed,

26 RCW 49.60.210(1); Currier v. Northland Servs., Inc.. 182 Wn. App. 733,
742, 332 P.3d 1006 (2014), review denied. 182 Wn.2d 1006 (2015).
27 Currier. 182 Wn. App. at 743.
28 Kirbv. 124 Wn. App. at 465 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
DeGuiseppe v. Vill. of Bellwood, 68 F.3d 187, 192 (7th Cir. 1995)).
29 Kirbv. 124 Wn. App. at 465.
30 187 Wn. App. 1, 13-14, 349 P.3d 864 (2015).
31 Boyd, 187 Wn. App. at 14.
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stating, "We express no opinion as to whether these employment actions, taken

individually, constituted adverse employment actions as a matter of law.

However, taken in context, a reasonable jury could find that these actions, taken

together, were materially adverse."32

Marin's reliance on Boyd is misplaced. That decision did not dispense

with the requirement that a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to survive

summary judgment. Marin ignores the differences between his evidence and

that of the plaintiff's in Boyd. In contrast to the hospital in Boyd, the County

never suspended Marin without pay; it never reported him to the police or other

authorities. Only in the context of these concededly adverse actions did Division

Two find that a jury could conclude that the hospital's other actions were