District Attorney to accomplish that objective above all else.
(Young v United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 US at
810; People v Adams, 20 NY3d at 613; Cowles v Brownell, 73
NY2d at 387.) This interest in protecting the Police Depart-
ment from civil liability for damages thus may be viewed as a
pecuniary interest of the prosecuting attorney’s employer,
superiors, and co-employees, quite apart from any economic
benefits through achieving justice and serving the public. The
District Attorney, of course, is not and may not be burdened
with such separate interests in insulation from civil liability.
Under County Law § 700 (8), the District Attorney must ‘‘give
his whole time to his duties and shall not engage in the practice
of law . . . which interferes with the performance of his duties
as district attorney.’’ Attorneys’ advice or services to protect the
Police Department and officers from civil liability constitute
the practice of law separate from the District Attorney’s duties,
which petitioners allege interferes with these duties when
delegated to respondent Police Department.
This restriction does not apply to nonattorneys, such as po-
lice officers or state troopers who have been permitted to pros-
ecute offenses that these public officers observed. (People v
Soddano, 86 NY2d at 728; People v Murphy, 29 Misc 3d 79, 81
[App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010].) Those deci-
sions, moreover, indicate no potential civil liability of the pub-
lic officers from which they were interested in protecting
themselves.
In contrast, the District Attorney is not permitted to dele-
gate the prosecution of offenses to attorneys who represent the
victims of those offenses. (Matter of Sedore v Epstein, 56 AD3d
194 58 MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS, 3d SERIES