authority to attorneys of the Police Department.
In the pending criminal prosecutions, petitioners moved to
disqualify the Police Department attorneys from prosecuting
the criminal actions. (Verified petition & complaint ¶ 17.)
Petitioners based their motion on the District Attorney’s un-
lawful delegation and on the Police Department attorneys’
conflict of interest between representing the interests of the
Police Department and its officers involved in petitioners’ ar-
rests, who may be subject to civil liability for the arrests and
prosecutions, and the interests of the people of the county. The
New York City Criminal Court in New York County (Mitchell,
J.) determined that the delegation was lawful and did not
entail an impermissible conflict of interest and denied petition-
ers’ motions. (Id. ¶ 18, exhibit B.) Petitioners have not sought
to take an intermediate appeal, but concede that they may ap-
peal the Criminal Court’s denial of their motions after any
conviction in the criminal actions. Petitioners now seek a de-
termination by this court of the very issues that the Criminal
Court already determined and that the Appellate Term may
MATTER OF JEFFRYES v VANCE [58 Misc 3d 185] 187
review upon either of petitioners’ conviction of any of the of-
fenses with which petitioners are charged. (Cayuga Indian Na-
tion of N.Y. v Gould, 14 NY3d 614, 633-634 [2010]; Matter of
Morgenthau v Erlbaum, 59 NY2d 143, 149 [1983]; see Hurrell-
Harring v State of New York, 15 NY3d 8, 16 [2010].)
I. Petitioners’ Factual Allegations
According to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) be-
tween the District Attorney and the Police Department (veri-
fied petition & complaint, exhibit A), the District Attorney
delegated to the Police Department the authority to prosecute