determination of unlawfulness and liability. (CPLR 7806; Mat-
190 58 MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS, 3d SERIES
ter of Gross v Perales, 72 NY2d 231, 236 [1988]; Hughes Vil.
Rest., Inc. v Village of Castleton-on-Hudson, 46 AD3d 1044,
1047 [3d Dept 2007]; see Metropolitan Taxicab Bd. of Trade v
New York City Taxi & Limousine Commn., 115 AD3d 521, 522
[1st Dept 2014].)
Notably, respondents do not move to dismiss this action and
proceeding based on res judicata or collateral estoppel. (CPLR
3211 [a] [5].) Nor may the criminal prosecutions determine
respondents’ liability or petitioners’ damages.
Petitioners allege claims entitling them to relief. They claim
that City respondents are acting in a prosecutorial capacity in
excess of a prosecutor’s authorized power because they are
pursuing objectives in criminal prosecutions that place these
respondents’ own interests in conflict with the interests of the
people of the county in achieving justice. (Cowles v Brownell,
73 NY2d at 386; see Morgenthau v Erlbaum, 59 NY2d at 147.)
As long as the criminal prosecutions proceed without interfer-
ence, petitioners’ claims here do not impede the orderly prog-
ress and speedy disposition of the criminal actions. (Hurrell-
Harring v State of New York, 15 NY3d at 24 and n 6; see
Morgenthau v Erlbaum, 59 NY2d at 149, 151-152.) Depending
on those dispositions, however, petitioners may be deprived of
an adequate remedy for the harms suffered if those prosecu-
tions are determined to have been unlawful. (CPLR 7803 [3];
Dondi v Jones, 40 NY2d at 13; see Matter of Lipari v Owens, 70
NY2d 731, 732-733 [1987].)
If after the criminal actions’ disposition petitioners still claim
harm from unlawful prosecutions and respondents’ liability for
those unlawful actions and the harm caused (Hurrell-Harring