the face of payment of the full arrearage prior to the quit
date, is unethical, immoral, unreasonable, and unkind.’’
The plaintiff denied the defendant’s special defenses.
Also on May 6, 2024, the defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment. The defendant argued that there
was no genuine issue of material fact that he had paid
the arrearage owed to the plaintiff for his nonpayment
of rent in full prior to the quit date and that the only
outstanding amount due to the plaintiff was its claimed
legal fees of $1600. The defendant argued that he was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of
his special defenses—that he had cured his nonpayment
of rent and that the doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture
precluded eviction in this case. On May 7, 2024, the
plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment on the ground that a genuine
issue of material fact existed.
On that same date, May 7, 2024, the court sent notices
to the parties scheduling a hearing on the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff’s objec-
tion thereto, and trial on the summary process com-
plaint for May 23, 2024.
On May 23, 2024, the court, Stone, J., first heard
argument on the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment. After hearing arguments from both parties, the
court orally denied the motion for summary judgment
on the ground that a genuine issue of material fact
existed. The court explained: ‘‘I am going to deny the
motion for summary judgment. I think there is a ques-
tion of fact as to whether the nonpayment was cured
or whether it could be cured. I also recognize that, you
know, under the equitable relief, that findings of fact
have to be made. I understand your position . . . that
there is no question of fact, but as the trier, I am required
to make factual findings regarding whether the equita-
ble doctrine of [non]forfeiture is appropriate in this
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