recover damages, we also stated in Rasor, "In this sense, the term has a second,
consonant and established meaning. '"actual" damages are synonymous with
compensatory damages'. Thus, actual damages, flowing from injury in fact, are to
be distinguished from damages which are 'nominal,' 'exemplary' or 'punitive."' !d.
at 530 n.3 (citations omitted) (quoting Werder v. Hoffman, 238 F. Supp. 437, 445
(M.D. Pa. 1965)). We therefore held that "actual damages" under the FCRA
includes all of the elements of compensatory awards generally, including harm to
business reputation and emotional suffering. !d. at 530.
In Martini, we again construed the term "actual damages" and reached the
same conclusion. 137 Wn.2d at 364. Martini discussed "actual damages" as used
in Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW, which
7
Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
mandates "liberal construction." 137 Wn.2d at 364; RCW 49.60.020. The plaintiff
alleged disability discrimination and sought front and back pay. Martini, 137 Wn.2d
at 361. The WLAD permits the recovery of "the actual damages sustained by the
person" but contains no definition of the term "actual damages." RCW
49.60.030(2). Although emotional distress damages were not directly at issue in
Martini, we cited Rasor and concluded that RCW 49.60.030(2) authorizes the
recovery of full compensatory damages, including "damages for emotional distress,"
and excluded only nominal, exemplary, or punitive damages. Martini, 137 Wn.2d
at 370, 367-68.
Since 1976, we have consistently stated that this is the established meaning of