("relocation assistance, prepaid deposits, and prepaid rent"). RCW 59.18.085(3)(e)
(emphasis added). By limiting the recovery under this statute to economic damages
only, and by further limiting these damages to "relocation assistance," majority at
10, the majority's holding conflicts with both statutory phrases italicized
immediately above.
First, the statutory word "any" is a broad modifier. See State v. Sutherby, 165
Wn.2d 870, 880-82, 204 P.3d 916 (2009); State v. Westling, 145 Wn.2d 607, 611-
12, 40 P.3d 669 (2002). This broad language supports an expansive reading of the
statute.
Second, we must give full effect to the language "in addition" to. The statute
specifies that "any" actual damages are available not as part of, but "in addition" to
the enumerated damages, including damages that "exceed the amount of relocation
assistance that is payable." RCW 59.18.085(3)(e). Thus, the statute's context, in
4
Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
addition to its express language, reveals the legislature's intent to permit the
recovery of emotional distress damages; a contrary interpretation would render the
legislature's use of this broad language meaningless. 2
The majority relies on an argument that no party has made: that the language
"that exceed the amount of relocation assistance that is payable" shows an intent to
limit the amount of available damages to relocation damages only. Majority at 6-7.
But this interpretation is problematic for two reasons. First, it treats the concluding
language as a limit on both the amount and the nature of damages that a displaced