damages include emotional distress damages.
I therefore respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the RLTA
bars displaced tenants from recovering emotional distress damages. But I concur in
the majority's result that Jose Segura and Tabetha Gonzalez (collectively Segura)
cannot recover emotional distress damages here. The statute allows recovery of such
actual damages only when they exceed the statutory $2,000 of relocation assistance.
RCW 59.18.085(3)(b), (e). Segura's request for $1,200 in actual damages does not
exceed that $2,000 amount. Therefore, the RL TA prohibits them from recovering
actual damages, including emotional distress damages, in this case.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. O.S. T v. Regence
BlueShield, 181 Wn.2d 691, 696, 335 P.3d 416 (2014). We begin with the statute's
plain language, considering the text of the provision in question, the statute's
context, and the statutory scheme as a whole. State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 192,
298 P.3d 724 (2013). Our objective is to determine and to apply the legislature's
intent. O.S. T, 181 Wn.2d at 696.
2
Segura v. Cabrera, No. 90088-4
(Gordon McCloud, J., Concurring in Result)
II. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
This case requires us to construe the statutory term "actual damages" as used
in RCW 59.18.085(3)( e) and to decide if the right to recover such "actual damages"
includes a right to recover emotional distress damages.
RCW 59.18.085 states, in relevant part,