Wash. Court of Appeals published opinion — 323820.opn.pdf

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of the ALJ's other findings are predicated on this legal proposition that the association

agreements remained operative because they had not been terminated in the manner set

forth in paragraph 7 or 8.

When, as here, the interpretation of a contract does not depend on the use of

extrinsic evidence, it presents a question of law. Viking Bank v. Firgrove Commons 3,

LLC, 183 Wn. App. 706, 711, 334 P.3d 116 (2014). A conclusion oflaw is reviewed as a

conclusion of law, even if erroneously labeled as a finding of fact. Dave Johnson Ins.

Inc. v. Wright, 167 Wn. App. 758, 778, 275 P.3d 339 (2012). We review conclusions of

law de novo.

Section 3 of the association agreements provide the date on which the term of

agreement begins and that the agreement "shall continue until terminated in a manner set

forth in paragraphs 7 and 8." AR at 241,247. Section 7 of the association agreements

DeFelice v. Emp 't Sec. Dep't
No. 32382-0-111- dissent

addresses the manner by which "either" party may terminate the agreement-thereby

addressing the fact that the relationship is terminable at the will of either party, as the

majority observes. 4 AR at 243,249; see majority at 8. Section 8 deals with termination

in the event of a party's incapacity by reason of illness or other causes, an event that no

one suggests ever arose. Neither section 7 nor 8 deals with termination ofthe agreement

by mutual agreement of the parties. Notwithstanding the language of section 3 of the

agreements, the parties could mutually agree, orally, to terminate or modifY the

agreement.

It is hornbook law that a contract in writing, but not required to be so by the statute