11
interpreting a statute, “[w]e first consider the words of the
statutes, as statutory language is generally the most reliable
indicator of legislation’s intended purpose. [Citation.] We
consider the ordinary meaning of the relevant terms, related
provisions, terms used in other parts of the statute, and the
structure of the statutory scheme.”].)
Our interpretation of the language in section 685.040 is
consistent with the merger doctrine, which recognizes that
“[u]pon entry of judgment, all further contractual rights are
extinguished, and the plaintiff’s rights”—and in this case, the
limitation on plaintiff’s rights—“are thereafter governed by the
rights on the judgment, not by any rights which might have been
held to have arisen from the contract.” (Tomaselli v.
Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1770; accord,
Guo, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 751; Globalist, supra,
167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1274; Jaffe, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at
p. 935.) As discussed, the Legislature in drafting the current
version of section 685.040 did not intend to abrogate the merger
doctrine, but rather, to ensure that a judgment creditor could
obtain attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing a judgment
notwithstanding termination of their contractual rights by
merger into the judgment. (Conservatorship of McQueen (2014)
59 Cal.4th 602, 609-610; Gray1, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at
p. 890.)7 The Legislature could easily have specified that