Oviedo v. Windsor Twelve Properties, LLC, 212 Cal. App. 4th 97 (2012)

Citation: Oviedo v. Windsor Twelve Properties, LLC, 212 Cal. App. 4th 97 (2012)
Parent Document: Oviedo v. Windsor Twelve Properties, LLC, 212 Cal. App. 4th 97 (2012)
Jurisdiction: California (state)
Effective Date: 2012-11-19
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5811531/oviedo-v-windsor-twelve-properties-llc/ ↗

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Although the litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), generally bars claims based on a landlord’s delivery of a three-day notice to quit immediately followed by the filing of an unlawful detainer action (Bisno v. Douglas Emmett Realty Fund 1988 (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1552 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 492]), our Supreme Court has declined to extend such privilege to malicious prosecution actions based thereon (Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1242 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 398, 163 P.3d 89] [citing Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 382 [295 P.2d 405]]). Thus, to prevail on her claim for malicious prosecution, appellant must show that the unlawful detainer action was (1) terminated in her favor; (2) begun with malice; and (3) prosecuted without probable cause. (Bisno v. Douglas Emmett Realty Fund 1988, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1544.) To satisfy this showing, appellant may not rely solely on her verified complaint. (Paiva v. Nichols, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1016-1017.) Instead, she must present competent admissible evidence on each of the three elements of a malicious prosecution cause of action. (Ibid.) a. Favorable Termination

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