10
agreed on to limit the occupation, is a tenancy at will.’” (Borden v. Stiles (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 337, 348; accord, Pacific Coast Joint Stock Land Bank of San Francisco v. Jones
(1939) 14 Cal.2d 8, 14.)
Considering that the complaint alleged defendant occupied the premises since 2017, that
plaintiff was aware of defendant’s long-term occupancy of the unit—including a period of 18
months when defendant was married to the original tenant, that the November 15, 2023 Notice
of Change of Terms of Tenancy identified defendant as “the tenant who is in possession of the
premises” and stated “your tenancy of the above designated premises will be changed” (italics
added), and that the three-day notice alleged defendant was delinquent in her rent payments
“pursuant to the lease or rental agreement under which you hold the possession of the . . .
premises,” we conclude an implied at-will tenancy was created.11 (Borden v. Stiles, supra, 92
Cal.App.5th at p. 348; § 1954.51, subd. (f); see SMRCCA, art. XVIII, § 1801; see also
Parkmerced, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 495; cf. Miller, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. Supp. 20,
fn. 6 [tenant’s mother who did not reside at the property and was “virtually unknown” to the
lessor, was not protected under the rent control ordinance].)
Because defendant was an at-will tenant, and not a sublessee or assignee, she did not fall
within the narrow parameters of section 1954.53, subdivision (d)(2). There is no clear
indication the Legislature intended to preempt the City from extending its protections to
defendant, as the spouse of Milton Reyes, a lawful occupant, or as an at-will tenant by implied
agreement. As explained by the Mosser court, “[t]he Legislature’s use of distinct terms
indicates different intended meanings. Had the Legislature meant rent decontrol to occur when
the party to the rental agreement vacates, it could easily have used the term ‘party,’ as it did in
subdivision (d)(4) concerning sublease prohibition waivers. ‘“[W]hen different words are used
in contemporaneously enacted, adjoining subdivisions of a statute, the inference is compelling
that a difference in meaning was intended.”’” (Mosser, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 513.)