favor of the landlord restoring possession of the property to the landlord, the court may
award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the landlord.”
For the reasons discussed above, the trial court erred in entering the default
judgment order. See RCW 59.18.410(1), .290(3). The landlord has not shown that
applicable law permits recovery of fees and expenses under RAP 18.1(a). Accordingly,
we deny the landlord’s request for attorney fees on appeal. 5
5
The tenant argues that regardless of the outcome on appeal, the landlord is not entitled to
attorney fees because the unlawful detainer action was served by alternative service. Appellant’s
Reply Br. at 21 (quoting RCW 59.18.055(2) (“‘[N]o money judgment may be entered against the
tenant or tenants until such time as jurisdiction over the tenant or tenants is obtained.’”)); Negash
v. Sawyer, 131 Wn. App. 822, 827, 129 P.3d 824 (2006) (holding RCW 59.18.055(2) precluded
20
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
CONCLUSION
RCW 59.18.365(3) directs tenants to respond in writing to the eviction summons
with a “notice of appearance.” A tenant who responds “will be notified of [their] hearing
date in a document called an ‘Order to Show Cause.’” RCW 59.18.365(3). The tenant in
this case filed a written notice of response by the deadline listed on the summons. The
tenant complied with the eviction summons. The trial court therefore erred in entering a
default judgment based on the tenant’s failure to answer.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s entry of default and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.