of indigency. Yet our court rule plainly applies to tenants facing default. SPR
98.24W(2) (“If the tenant is unrepresented and the court issues a writ of restitution before
judgment or by default. . . .” (emphasis added)). We have recognized that when the Civil
Rules conflict with unlawful detainer statutes, the statutes control as special proceedings.
Christensen, 162 Wn.2d at 374. This distinction requires a conflict. Absent a conflict,
the Civil Rules are the rules of practice for unlawful detainer actions. Hall v.
16
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Sangha v. Keen et al., No. 103332-0
Feigenbaum, 178 Wn. App. 811, 818, 319 P.3d 61 (2014) (citing RCW 59.12.180).
Thus, no reference to the rules or general proceedings is required.
More fundamentally, landlords seeking a default judgment and writ of restitution
do so in the context of an unlawful detainer action. The grounds for default stem from a
failure to respond to the eviction summons and complaint. E.g., RCW 59.18.365(3); 4A
ELIZABETH A. TURNER, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: RULES PRACTICE SPR 98.24W at 46
(8th ed. Supp. 2024) (“A tenant does not have the right to appointed counsel until a
lawsuit is formally commenced, either by service of a summons and complaint or by the
filing of the lawsuit with the court.”). The landlord asks us to carve out default judgment
motions and hearings from the unlawful detainer statutes without identifying a conflict or
any other justification. We decline to do so.
Finally, it appears indigent tenant representation was funded, staffed, and
operational during the eviction in this case. RCW 59.18.640(1) (“[s]ubject to the
availability of amounts appropriated for this specific purpose”); OFF. OF CIV. LEGAL AID,