Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Citation
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Parent Document
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Jurisdiction
- California (state)
- Effective Date
- 1985-03-15
Other Sections in This Document (18)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
- Little v. Sanchez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 501 (1985)
Full Text
1,015 charsInitially appellants relied rather heavily upon County of Ventura v. Tillen (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 105 [183 Cal.Rptr. 741], to support their contention that the many judgments they wished to challenge were void in their entirety because the stipulations upon which they were based did not, on their faces, demonstrate that the defendants named therein knew of their various judicial rights, and that with such knowledge they had made voluntary and intelligent decisions to waive those rights. It is possible, therefore, that the trial court rejected this basis for class certification because it correctly anticipated our Supreme Court’s later disapproval of this aspect of Tillen in County of Los Angeles v. Soto (1984) 35 Cal. 3d 483, 492, fn. 4 [198 Cal.Rptr. 779, 674 P.2d 750], However, even when this basis for certification is eliminated, the subject judgments nonetheless remain void insofar as their enforcement is made contingent upon respondent’s tenants making the required future “installment payments.”