16
Supp. 1, 8.) In particular, “ ‘[t]he statutory requirements in [unlawful
detainer] proceedings “ ‘must be followed strictly.’ ” ’ ” (Dr. Leevil, at p. 480.)
We also agree that, at least at this stage of the proceedings, it is irrelevant
whether the tenants have asserted or will assert they are entitled to
protection from eviction or to additional relocation payments. (See DHI
Cherry Glen Associates, L.P. v. Gutierrez (2010) 46 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 8–
11.) We note, however, that the complaint alleges the tenants already sought
and received additional relocation payments, suggesting the notice of
termination’s instructions for submitting notice of protected status did not
hamper the tenants from asserting their rights.
In any case, the tenants fail to convince us that the deviation between
the notice of termination’s wording of how to bring protected status to the
landlord’s attention and the Rent Ordinance’s wording of the same renders
the entire unlawful detainer action “fatally[]flawed.” If the tenants were to
provide a statement of protected status directly to appellants, and appellants
rejected it because it was not sent to their attorney, the tenants might have
an argument that they were required to comply only with the Rent
Ordinance, not the notice of termination’s more specific requirements. But
the tenants have not demonstrated that any provision of the Rent Ordinance,
the Board rules, or any other authority governing unlawful detainer actions
requires an eviction notice even to address the method by which a tenant is to
submit a statement, much less limits what the notice may say in that regard.
The identification of a more particular method for submitting information to
a landlord is hardly akin to the failure to comply with governing requirements
for seeking the remedy of unlawful detainer. (Cf., e.g., Dr. Leevil, supra,
6 Cal.5th at pp. 478–480 [landlord not entitled to relief where it did not
satisfy statutory prerequisites for serving notice of removal].) Accordingly,