9
The Rent Ordinance “ ‘was enacted to respond to two principal factors:
(a) a critically low vacancy rate within the city and county [of San Francisco],
and (b) excessive, unregulated rent increases.’ ” (Parkmerced, supra,
215 Cal.App.3d at p. 495.) Although “ ‘[t]he clear objective of the ordinance
and the compelling public policy which gave birth to its enactment . . .
was the extension of some measure of protection to tenants in residence’ ”
(ibid., italics omitted), the ordinance also has a goal of “assur[ing] landlords
fair and adequate rents.” (Rent Ord., § 37.1, subd. (b)(6).) In addition, the
family move-in provision, while subject to significant limitations, benefits
landlords in that it is “consistent with the state Ellis Act which provides that,
with limited exceptions, a statute, ordinance[,] or regulation may not ‘compel
the owner of any residential real property to offer, or continue to offer,
accommodations in the property for rent or lease . . . .’ (Gov. Code, § 7060,
subd. (a).)” (Baba v. Board of Supervisors (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 504, 509.)
The tenants suggest that a trustee is not a “natural person” because a
trustee takes only “representative actions . . . on behalf of a trust.”8 But case
law has recognized the distinctive status of a trustee who is, as both
appellants are here, also settlor and beneficiary of a revocable living trust.
For example, in Aulisio v. Bancroft (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1516, the Court of
Appeal held that a plaintiff who appeared in propria persona on behalf of a
trust of which he was the “sole settlor, trustee, and beneficiary” did not
violate the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law under