7
A. Challenge to Order Granting Anti-SLAPP Motions Is Not Cognizable
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting the anti-SLAPP motions
since the evidence in opposition to the motions was adequate to establish a reasonable
probability of prevailing on the malicious prosecution claim. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1)
[cause of action arising from matters subject to anti-SLAPP shall be subject to a special
motion to strike, unless the court determines the plaintiff has established “a probability
that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim”].) They emphasize that a plaintiff “need only
establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit’ [citation] to avoid being stricken as a
SLAPP.” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291, citing
Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 738.)
Appellants claim that they satisfied this threshold as to each of the three elements
comprising their malicious prosecution claim by showing that the unlawful detainer
action was (1) initiated at respondents Kruger’s and Rothbard’s direction and pursued to
a legal termination in favor of Reyes and Golden State Care Collective, (2) initiated or
maintained without probable cause, and (3) initiated or maintained with malice. (See
Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 775 [summarizing the elements of the civil tort of
malicious prosecution]; Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 965-966.) Appellants
seek to establish that the appellate reversal of the unlawful detainer judgment was a
determination on the merits, as opposed to a technical or procedural determination, and
that the purported probable cause for the unlawful detainer action was based on Kruger’s
false testimony about having returned the $2,800 rental payment in cash. We are,
however, unable to review appellants’ challenge to the anti-SLAPP order because
appellants failed to timely appeal from it.
“A reviewing court has jurisdiction over a direct appeal only when there is (1) an
appealable order or (2) an appealable judgment.” (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696.) Whether a trial court’s order is appealable is determined by
statute. (Ibid.) The anti-SLAPP statute provides that an “order granting or denying a