BY THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on September 25, 2020, be modified as
follows:
1. On page 11, in the last sentence of the first paragraph which begins with the
words “The fact that the trial court did not rule,” delete “rule on the request for” and
insert “address respondents’ statutory right to” in its place. In that same sentence, after
the citation to “(Maughan, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247)” add the following
sentences:
The provision for attorney fees and costs in the January 23 judgment furthermore
cannot be construed as a “substantial modification” of the order granting the special
motions to strike—such as would restart the 60–day period for filing a notice of appeal
(Sanchez v. Strickland (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 758, 765), because respondents’ claim to
statutory attorney fees and costs (§ 426.16, subd. (c)(1)) did not materially affect the
rights of the parties as determined in the November 22 order. (See Dakota Payphone,
LLC v. Alcaraz (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 493, 504]; id. at p. 509 [holding that the amended
judgment did not supersede the original judgment for purposes of computing time to
appeal, where the resulting change in “monetary positions of the litigants . . . did not
deprive the parties of their ability to challenge” the original judgment by timely filing an
appeal]; see also Torres v. City of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 214, 222 [noting it
“well settled” that a modified judgment to add attorney fees and costs does not
substantially change the original judgment or affect the time to appeal].)
2. On page 19, after the last sentence of the first full paragraph which ends
with the words, “but not when served by a party,” insert the following footnote:
11 We do not mean to suggest that section 659 incorporates the definition of
judgment set forth in section 664.5 beyond the limits articulated by the California
Supreme Court in Palmer. There, the court explained that “the posttrial motion sections
(§§ 659, 660) . . . peg their jurisdictional time limits to mailing of notice of entry of
judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to section 664.5, but neither section refers to
section 664.5 in describing service by a party. Thus, the plain language of sections 659
and 660 expressly incorporates the provisions of section 664.5 only when the court clerk
mails notice of entry of judgment.” (Palmer, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 1271-1272, italics
added.) Rather, we view the statutory reference as providing reinforcement for our
general conclusion that an order which is directly appealable and which serves as final
adjudication of the rights of the parties also triggers the statutory time limit for a posttrial
motion for new trial.