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noting its analysis “is reinforced by the fact that the policy underlying the unfair
competition statute can be vindicated by multiple parties other than plaintiff” including
the Attorney General, district attorneys and certain city attorneys. (Id. at p. 1204.)
Rubin was preceded by Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355 in which the plaintiff
sued a person who had admitted during an arbitration hearing that she eavesdropped on a
telephone conversation between plaintiff and his former wife. Plaintiff based his suit,
in part, on Penal Code section 637.2, which provides for a private cause of action
by any person “injured” by another’s violation of the Privacy Act, which prohibits
eavesdropping, wiretapping and unauthorized recording of communications under a
multitude of circumstances. (Pen. Code, §§ 630-637.9.) The defendant relied on the
litigation privilege as her defense. The Supreme Court held the defense had merit.
“[N]othing indicates that in enacting Penal Code section 637.2 the Legislature intended
to immunize causes of action under that statute from the [litigation privilege].” (Ribas,
at p. 365.) Thus, the Court concluded, to the extent the plaintiff’s complaint alleges that
he suffered injury solely as a result of the defendant’s testimony at the arbitration
hearing, it is barred by the litigation privilege. (Ibid.)
Rubin and Ribas both addressed statutes that cover a broad spectrum of conduct,
none of which specifically relates to litigation. It was only because the facts that gave
rise to the causes of action in those cases happened to involve litigation activities that the
privilege was implicated. Neither statute “would be significantly or wholly inoperable if
its enforcement were barred when in conflict with the privilege.” (Action Apartment,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1246.) On the contrary, in Rubin the Court observed that the
policy underlying the unfair competition statute could be vindicated by parties other than
the plaintiff, including the Attorney General, district attorneys and certain city attorneys.
(Rubin v. Green, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1204.)
Section 1942.5, unlike the unfair competition and privacy statutes, specifically
creates a cause of action for, among other things, bringing a certain kind of lawsuit.
Subdivision (c) of section 1942.5 makes it “unlawful” for a lessor to “bring an action to