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‘liberally construed to effect its objectives and to suppress, not encourage, the mischief
at which it was directed. [Citation.]’” (Barela v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d
244, 251.)
In Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 803, 812, the appellate court held that
the cause of action for retaliation recognized by section 1942.5 applies to tenants of
a mobile home park. The court reasoned: “By their terms, subdivisions (c) and (f)
of section 1942.5 give a right of action to any lessee who has been subjected to an act
of unlawful retaliation. Thus, on its face the statute provides protection to mobilehome
park tenants who own their own dwellings and merely rent space from their landlord.”
Defendants maintain that insofar as section 1942.5 purports to allow a tenant to
sue a landlord for “bring[ing] an action to recover possession” it is trumped by the
“litigation privilege” provision of section 47, subdivision (b).
“The usual formulation” of the litigation privilege is that it “applies to any
communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other
participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that
have some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990)
50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) The privilege applies without regard to the defendant’s “motives,
morals, ethics or intent.” (Id. at p. 220.)
Despite its broad scope, our high court has recognized that “the Legislature
remains free to create exceptions to the litigation privilege[.]” (Action Apartment Assn.,
Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1247 (Action Apartment).) The
question is whether the Legislature did so in enacting section 1942.5, subdivisions (c)
and (f).
In Action Apartment, the Supreme Court considered a challenge under the
litigation privilege to a city ordinance that penalized a landlord who brought an action to
recover possession of a rental unit “without a reasonable factual or legal basis.” (Action
Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1239.) The Court held that this provision of the city
ordinance was “inimical to the important purposes of the litigation privilege” including