Accordingly, the constitutionally protected jurisdiction of the Supreme Court does not prohibit the Legislature from conferring exclusive original jurisdiction upon an agency in connection with the administration of a statutory regulatory program. In situations where the Legislature has made that choice, the Supreme Court’s power is limited to article 78 review, except where the applicability or constitutionality of the regulatory statute, or other like questions, are in issue (see, e.g., Seawall Assocs. v City of New York, 74 NY2d 92; 520 E. 81st St. Assocs. v Lenox Hill Hosp., 38 NY2d 525; Niagara Falls Power Co. v Halpin, 267 App Div 236, affd sub nom. Niagara Falls Power Co. v White, 292 NY 705).
The only issues raised by plaintiffs complaint were his satisfaction of the regulatory conditions for obtaining certificates of eviction and demolishing a structure containing protected apartment units. The earlier described provisions of the rent-control and rent-stabilization laws demonstrate that the Legislature intended DHCR and HPD to be the exclusive initial arbiters of whether an owner has, in fact, met these regulatory conditions. In addition to the many references to the need to establish the necessary facts to the agency’s satisfaction and the other references to determinations and findings by the agency (Administrative Code § 26-408 [b] [3], [4] [a] , [b], [d]; [5] [a], [b] [i]), the distinction drawn in the rent-control provisions between eviction proceedings that may be commenced immediately in court, without prior approval of the DHCR (Administrative Code § 26-408 [a]), and those that require agency-issued "certificate[s] of eviction” (id., § 26-408 [b] ) evinces a legislative intent to have issues arising in the latter class of cases determined, in the first