Edge Management Consulting, Inc. v. Blank, 25 A.D.3d 364 (2006)

Citation: Edge Management Consulting, Inc. v. Blank, 25 A.D.3d 364 (2006)
Parent Document: Edge Management Consulting, Inc. v. Blank, 25 A.D.3d 364 (2006)
Jurisdiction: New York (state)
Effective Date: 2006-01-10
Original Source: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5836114/edge-management-consulting-inc-v-blank/ ↗

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The Blank Trust first contends that common-law indemnification is not solely available in cases where the defendant is held vicariously liable by statute, but rather any “defendant whose liability to an injured plaintiff is merely secondary or vicarious is entitled to common-law indemnification from the actual wrongdoer who by actual misconduct caused the plaintiff’s injuries, and whose liability to the plaintiff is therefore primary” (Menorah Nursing Home v Zukov, 153 AD2d 13, 23 [1989], citing Mauro v McCrindle, 70 AD2d 77 [1979], affd 52 NY2d 719 [1980], and Restatement of Restitution § 76). The Blank Trust cites Elkman v Southgate Owners Corp. (246 AD2d 314 [1998]), as entitling it to indemnification as a lessor whose liability is entirely vicarious, and where the noxious condition was caused by a neighbor. In addition, the Blank Trust contends that even if common-law indemnification was only available to parties whose vicarious liability is derived from statute, it would nevertheless qualify. This argument rests on the premise that Edge is seeking to hold the Blank Trust liable for a breach of the warranty of habitability, a statutory obligation under Real Property Law § 235-b.

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