The court must consider whether Plaintiff and Defendant’s living situation constitutes a “shared
occupancy” for purposes of termination of shared occupancy under 9 V.S.A. § 4467(h). If the living
arrangement constitutes a “shared occupancy” rental agreement, the motion for summary judgment
should not be granted and the parties must proceed to an eviction hearing. If, however, the living
arrangement does not constitute a “shared occupancy” rental agreement, the motion for summary
judgment should be granted.
Section 4467(h) applies to “[a] rental arrangement whereby a person rents to another individual one or
more rooms in his or her personal residence that includes the shared use of any of the common living
spaces, such as the living room, kitchen, or bathroom[.]” Plaintiff’s Complaint references a verbal
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living agreement made in February 2024, under which Plaintiff asserts he and Defendant agreed to live
at the residence together, “including the shared use of common living spaces.”
The relationship between “shared occupants” is not well defined under the statute, and authoritative
case law is virtually silent on this issue. For these reasons, the court recognizes the opportunity for a
more tailored legislative solution for terminating tenancies where non-married romantic partners are
involved. Under these constraints, however, courts may consider the “plain and ordinary meaning” of
words not defined within a statute. Brisson Stone, LLC v. Town of Monkton, 2016 VT 15, ¶ 19, 201 Vt.
286, 293. This court has indicated that “[t]he plain language of Section 4467(h) reveals two predicates:
(1) that the tenant rent at least one room in the landlord's residence, and (2) that the landlord and tenant
share at least some common living spaces.” Heyde v. Macias, No. 23-CV-04076, at *1 (Vt. Super. Ct.
Wash. Civ. Div. Oct. 25, 2023).
In this case, there is no mention of certain areas within the home designated as “shared” between the
parties. Furthermore, protection orders issued against Plaintiff have prevented him from entering the
residence since March 27, 2024, and, presumably, Plaintiff and Defendant have not physically shared
any spaces within the residence since that time. In sum, the absence of the statutory element of shared
space within this living arrangement precludes the existence of a shared occupancy.
Vermont courts have also construed Section 4467(h) as applying to tenancy agreements where a
landlord lives at the residence and shares common living space(s) with the tenant, and the tenant rents
a separate, private room within the residence. See, e.g., In re McCarty, 2013 VT 47, ¶ 2, 194 Vt. 109
(finding that attorney assisting landlord failed to follow Section 4467(h) notice requirements when he
wrongly evicted individual who rented room in owner’s residence with shared access to other parts of
property); see also Heyde at *1 (court was unable to determine whether tenancy was subject to Section
4467(h) because of factual disputes as to whether tenants—who lived in “Tiny Home” on landlords’
property and shared bathroom and kitchen facilities with landlords—also rented room in landlords’
residence). Likewise, a New Hampshire statute similar to Section 4467(h) provides a definition
harmonious with the interpretations suggested by Vermont courts. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 540-B:1
(“A shared facility means real property rented for residential purposes which has separate sleeping
areas for each occupant and in which each occupant has access to and shares with the owner of the
facility one or more significant portions of the facility in common, such as kitchen, dining area,
bathroom, or bathing area, for which the occupant has no rented right of sole personal use.”). Again,
Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s filings lack any discussion of either party occupying separate spaces and
commonly shared areas within the residence. Thus, the termination of shared occupancy statute does
not apply to the living arrangement between Plaintiff and Defendant.
Finally, Defendant further asserts that since there is no shared occupancy agreement, Plaintiff did not
give Defendant adequate actual notice to vacate the property under the no-cause termination statute.
Courts must uphold the applicable statutory requirements for serving a notice of termination of
tenancy. “With respect to the termination of residential leases, we have followed the trend in other
jurisdictions to require ‘punctilious compliance with all statutory eviction procedures, including notice
provisions.’” Vermont Small Bus. Dev. Corp. v. Fifth Son Corp., 2013 VT 7, ¶ 15, 193 Vt. 185
(quoting In re Soon Kwon, 2011 VT 26, ¶ 14, 189 Vt. 598 (mem.) (quotation omitted)). Under the
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termination of tenancy statute, the length of notice required depends on the grounds for ending the
tenancy, and termination of shared occupancy is subject to a shortened notice period. See 9 V.S.A. §
4467. Here, Plaintiff served the notice of termination of tenancy on September 12, 2024, with a
termination date of October 8, 2024. This left Defendant with only 26 days to vacate the residence and
fails to comply with the 60-day notice requirement of 9 V.S.A. § 4467(c) for termination for no cause.
In summary, Section 4467(h) was an improper recourse for Plaintiff to terminate Defendant’s tenancy
and Plaintiff failed to provide adequate notice of termination of tenancy to Defendant.
ORDER
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Judgment is entered for
Defendant Ashlee Riddle.