landlords of participants. However, nothing in this provision confers a right upon the tenant to
continued housing subsidies during a court eviction proceeding. Another provision, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437n, discusses the eligibility requirements for assisted housing. However, this section suffers
the same fate as the aforementioned provision.
Because neither we nor Caswell can point to a specific statutory provision in the Housing
Act that confers a right relevant to DHC’s alleged violation of 24 C.F.R. § 982.311(b), Caswell
cannot pursue his claim under § 1983. For this reason, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to DHC on Caswell’s regulatory violation claim.
B. Due Process Violation
Caswell also argues that DHC violated his right to procedural due process. Caswell’s
argument is two-fold: first, he argues that the hearing was unfair because DHC sent him a notice
of termination before having the hearing. Second, he argues that the hearing was inappropriate
because his subsidies could not have legally been terminated while he remained in the apartment.
As to his first argument, Caswell correctly notes that 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(a)(2) requires that
“the PHA must give the opportunity for an informal hearing before the PHA terminates housing
assistance payments . . . .” However, here, DHC did not actually terminate Caswell’s benefits until
the day after the hearing. Therefore, the timing of the hearing with respect to the actual termination
of benefits was proper.
Caswell’s second claim is not a procedural due process argument. Caswell is not claiming
that he was denied adequate process. To be sure, he is unable to point to what additional procedural
safeguards should have been provided to better protect his property interest. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting forth a three-part test for determining whether particular
procedures comport with due process). Caswell was permitted to conduct discovery, present
evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and be represented by counsel, at his own expense. 24 C.F.R.
§ 982.555(e). Instead of pointing to a procedural flaw in his hearing, Caswell claims that he was
improperly denied his property interest, despite the fact that he received process. This claim is
inconsistent with a procedural due process claim. The “Due Process Clause has never been
construed to require that the procedures used to guard against an erroneous deprivation of a
protectible ‘property’ or ‘liberty’ interest be so comprehensive as to preclude any possibility of
error.” Higgs v. Bland, 888 F.2d 443, 449 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S.
1, 13 (1979)). Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this
claim.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.