I.
Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937 created the Tenant Based Assistance
Housing Choice Voucher Program (“Voucher Program”) in which the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) partially subsidizes the rent of qualifying low-income
individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a). HUD authorizes local public housing authorities (“PHAs”)
to administer the Voucher Program. Id. at § 1437f(b)(1). Oliver Caswell participated in the
Voucher Program, which was administered by DHC. Caswell was a beneficiary of the Voucher
Program from November 1986 until November 2000.
On September 16, 2000, Caswell’s landlord initiated eviction proceedings against him in
state court for violating their lease agreement by failing to keep the premises clean. As is required
by federal regulation, see 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(e)(2)(ii), the landlord sent a copy of the eviction
notice to DHC. Caswell continued to reside in the apartment. On September 25, 2000, DHC sent
Caswell a “Termination of Assistance Notice,” specifying that all rental payments made by DHC
on Caswell’s behalf would be terminated by November 1, 2000. The notice gave Caswell ten days
in which to request a hearing to appeal this decision. Caswell timely appealed, and DHC held a
hearing on November 1. Caswell represented himself at this hearing and failed to dispute the
landlord’s claims that he violated the lease agreement. The next day, DHC terminated Caswell’s
benefits.
The eviction action was tried in state court and, on November 27, Caswell was granted the
right to possess the apartment. The order granting Caswell continued possession became finalized
in January of 2001. Caswell claims that during the month of November, however, he continued to
live in the apartment without the assistance of the Voucher Program. At some point, Caswell was
unable to pay the full rent and was evicted. As a result, Caswell claims that he became homeless
for a short period of time. It appears that DHC has not reinstated Caswell’s subsidy.
Caswell filed a § 1983 claim against DHC and its director, alleging that DHC:
(1) improperly deprived Caswell benefits under the Voucher Program while the eviction proceeding
was pending in state court; and (2) denied Caswell adequate due process at the hearing. Caswell
filed a motion for summary judgment on these claims. The district court denied Caswell’s motion
and sua sponte granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court dismissed, with
prejudice, Caswell’s claims. This timely appeal followed.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Thomas v. City of
Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 428 (2005). Summary judgment is proper where the movant shows
through “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits . . . that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). “The nonmovant must rebut such
a showing by presenting sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for him; a mere
scintilla of evidence is insufficient to meet this burden.” Thomas, 398 F.3d at 429 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
When the district court not only denies summary judgment to the movant but sua sponte
grants summary judgment to the nonmovant, we must conduct two levels of review. “The substance
of the district court’s decision must of course meet the normal standards for summary judgement
[sic]. However, the procedural decision to enter summary judgment sua sponte must also be
reviewed to determine if the court abused its discretion by entering the judgment on its own motion.”
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Petroleum Specialties, Inc., 69 F.3d 98, 105 (6th Cir. 1995).
No. 04-1540 Caswell v. City of Detroit Housing Comm’n, et al. Page 3