“Although there may be a strict rule of law applicable generally to the construction of covenants in leases, yet, where from a survey of the whole instrument it appears that the parties intended that the strict rule should not apply, force will not be given to it. * * * In this case the parties to the original leases plainly indicated what they meant by the word ‘ re-enter/ and with that expression of their intention the technical common-law meaning of the word as used in ancient instruments is displaced. Here the word ‘ re-enter ’ in the 1st clause is associated with other words, which indicate that the re-entry contemplated means repossession. The words are ‘ re-enter the same either by force or otherwise.’ The association of the word ' otherwise ’ with the word ‘ re-enter ’ sufficiently indicates that it does not mean a re-entry under one single method, as in an action of ejectment. The word ' otherwise ’ necessarily broadens the signification of the word ‘ re-enter ’ and prevents its limitation to the technical definition of that word.”
This decision, while never reviewed by this court, has been cited without disapproval in Halpern v. Manhattan Ave. Theatre Corp. (220 N. Y. 655) and followed in the lower courts. (Ashton Holding Co. v. Ross, 98 Misc. Rep. 586.) We now adopt the holding and the reasoning thereon. The security clause is framed to cover the violation or omission to perform any of the covenants or conditions of the lease rather than default in the payment of rent merely. The word “ re-enter,” as used in the lease, should be given its natural meaning rather than its technical common-law meaning. Thus read, it survives the dispossess proceedings.